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Bank-affiliated private equity groups account for 30% of all private equity investments. Their market 
share is highest during peaks of the private equity market, when the parent banks arrange more debt 
financing for in-house transactions yet have the lowest exposure to debt. Using financing terms and ex-
post  performance,  we  show  that  overall  banks  do  not  make  superior  equity  investments  to  those  of 
standalone private equity groups. Instead, they appear to expand their private equity engagement to take 
advantage of the credit market booms while capturing private benefits from cross-selling of other banking 
services.  
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Banks’ involvement in private equity is an important economic phenomenon: Between 1983 and 2009, 
30% of all U.S. private equity investments (representing over $700 billion of transaction value) were 
sponsored by the private equity arm of a large bank (Figure 1). In the aftermath of the 2008 financial 
crisis, the passing of the “Volcker Rule” as part of the Dodd-Frank Act required banks to limit their 
exposure to private equity and hedge funds to no more than three percent of their Tier 1 capital. Although 
this rule called for substantial cutbacks in banks’ involvement in principal investing activities including 
private equity, very little is known about banks’ engagement in private equity and the pros and cons of 
combining private equity with banking. We seek to address this gap. 
[FIGURE 1] 
 Why do banks invest so actively in private equity? What positive and negative effects might 
these activities have on the economy? To be clear, banks has two ways to invest in private equity deals: 
they can act as the equity investor, or, as both the equity investor and the debt financier. In this paper, we 
refer to the first type of investments as “bank-affiliated” deals, and the second type as “parent-financed” 
deals. As such, bank involvement in private equity is a complex phenomenon that crosses a number of 
theories. Both types of investments can be motivated by good or bad reasons.  
For bank-affiliated private equity deals, a worrisome view—often invoked to justify the Volcker 
Rule—is that equity investments by banks could reflect bank managers’ incentives to grow revenues and 
maximize volatility, which can create systemic risks. Such incentives might arise because banks’ own 
equity values increase with volatility, and large banks enjoy implicit bail-out guarantees.
1  
On the other hand, there are also positive economic arguments for banks’ equity investments in 
firms. Through the screening of loans and monitoring, banks obtain private information about their clients 
                                                           
1 Expressing this  view, President Barack Obama said on  January 21, 2010, “Our government provides deposit 
insurance and other safeguards and guarantees to firms that operate banks. […] When banks benefit from the safety 
net that taxpayers provide—which includes lower-cost capital—it is not appropriate for them to turn around and use 
that cheap money to trade for profit. […] The fact is, these kinds of trading operations can create enormous and 
costly risks, endangering the entire bank if things go wrong. We simply cannot accept a system in which hedge 
funds or private equity firms inside banks can place huge, risky bets that are subsidized by taxpayers and that could 
pose a conflict of interest.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-financial-reform.  
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which can be valuable in other transactions. This informational advantage leads to the certification effect 
in cases of repeated lending (James (1987)) and securities underwriting (James and Weir (1990); Puri 
(1996)). Likewise, banks could use information generated during past  banking relationships to make 
private equity investment decisions. Not only does the bank enjoy information synergies from combining 
different activities, but also there is a positive externality: The bank’s engagement as a private equity 
investor could carry a positive signal about the quality of the deal to outside (debt) investors, resulting in 
better financing terms. This type of certification is akin to the arguments made for universal banks that 
combine commercial banking (lending) and investment banking (underwriting) in the debate about the 
Glass-Steagall Act (Kroszner and Rajan (1994); Puri (1996)).  
A third reason that may motivate banks to make private equity investments in firms is cross-
selling, a common phenomenon for large banks. Drucker and Puri (2005) provide evidence that banks 
cross-sell investment banking services to commercial banking clients. Hellmann, et al. (2008) document 
that banks cross-sell services to firms that receive their venture funding. By investing equity in a target 
firm, a bank stands to gain from future banking revenues from that company. Cross-selling is rational for 
banks and reflects efficiencies of a “one-stop-shop” of banking services, but there might be a concern if 
cross-selling gives banks incentives to make poor investments and take on excess risks.  
Approximately one-third of the bank-affiliated private equity deals have the loan backing the 
transaction  arranged  by  the  parent  bank  (Figure  1).  The  parent-financing  arrangement  gives  banks 
additional incentives to get involved in a private equity deal. It is worth noting that parent-financing is a 
unique bank-related phenomenon: Standard private equity groups by definition can only act as the equity 
investor but not the debt financier.  
Parent-financing might concern policymakers if banks use their position as intermediaries in the 
debt market to “originate and distribute” the debt of their own risky deals during the peak of the market, 
amplifying the cyclicality of investments and the credit market. Since the mid-1980s, debt financing for 
private equity deals has primarily come in the form of syndicated loans. Unlike traditional bank loans, 
syndicated loans are originated by banks but funded by a syndicate of lenders; banks retain only a fraction  
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of them. Shleifer and Vishny (2010) show that if outside debt investors misprice securities and banks 
retain only a fraction of the loan while receiving fees for originating the loan, rational banks will use all of 
their capital to fund more risky projects when the credit market is booming, amplifying the credit cycle.  
Although cyclicality has been well-documented in private equity investing in general (Kaplan and 
Stein (1993); Gompers and Lerner (2000); Kaplan and Strömberg (2009)), banks’ financing of in-house 
deals may be even more cyclical for two reasons. First, while regular private equity groups, such as 
Blackstone and KKR, also want to do more deals in the credit market booms, banks may have stronger 
incentives and more capacity to finance in-house deals because these deals provide more cross-selling 
opportunities to the banks. Cross-selling increases fees captured by the bank, while loan syndication 
means that the bulk of the cost (capital requirements and risk) is distributed to outside investors.
2 Second, 
if the heightened private equity deal-making during credit booms is viewed as a form of market timing, 
then such timing may be easier with in -house deals. Highly leveraged loans—such as those backing 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs)—are typically syndicated to institutional investors, including mutual funds, 
hedge  funds,  and  special  purpose  vehicles  such  as  collateralized  loan  obligations  (CLOs).  Loan 
syndication can be a time-consuming and uncertain process (Ivashina and Sun (2011)),
3 but banks are 
specialists in this process: Even the largest private equity groups rely on banks to line up financing, 
attesting to banks’ expertise. When banks have in-house private equity operations, information sharing 
across bank divisions allows the banks to fully utilize their advantage in matching credit demand with 
supply.  
Banks, therefore, may have both the motive and the ability to expand their private equity activity 
in credit booms. Indeed, Figure 1 suggests that banks’ involvement in private equity is more cyclical than 
                                                           
2 This point is formalized by Shleifer and Vishny (2010). In their model higher fee income for the originating banks 
reduces incentives to smooth lending over time, which increases cyclicality.  
3 Several institutional factors contribute to the complexity of loan syndication. An important class of syndic ate 
participants is CLOs, and their demand for loans was an important driver behind the 2004 -2007 leveraged-buyout 
boom (Shivdasani and Wang (2011)). However, CLOs are inflexible investment vehicles  that at all points must 
satisfy a set of investment restrictions to maintain the rating structure. Together with other frictions, this contributes 
to the volatility of CLOs’ demand for loans, making the syndication process uncertain. For detailed discussions of 
the syndication process, see Ivashina and Sun (2011).  
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the overall private equity market: their share of private equity market is high when overall private-equity 
activity is high (indicated by the shaded area), and the fraction of equity deals with parent-financing 
moves up and down with banks’ share of the overall private equity market.  
But parent-financing of in-house private equity deals may have positive effects as well. First, by 
doing so, the bank would be exposed to both the equity and the debt of the target (at least partially), 
resulting in a better alignment of equity and debt investors’ interests, reducing agency problems (Jiang, et 
al. (2010)). Second, just as relationship lenders play a certification role when they act as underwriters in 
the corporate bond market (Puri (1996)), the parent bank’s decision to lead a loan syndicate—in addition 
to making an equity investment—can convey a good signal to external syndicate participants and result in 
better loan terms. This type of lender certification is especially credible if the bank has past relationships 
with the firm (a proxy for bank information), and if the bank is reputable in the LBO lending market. 
To recap, banks have two ways to get involved with private equity investments: as the equity 
investor (bank-affiliated deals), or as both the equity investor and the lender (parent-financed deals). The  
hypotheses regarding the pros and cons of banks’ involvement in private equity are (starting with the 
“positive” views): (i) certification effects (as equity investors in the case of bank-affiliated deals, plus as 
lenders for the sub-sample of parent-financed deals); (ii) reducing debt-equity conflicts (in the case of 
parent-financed deals); (iii) cross-selling, (iv) maximization of volatility; and (v) a Shleifer and Vishny 
(2010) type of timing of the credit markets (in the case of parent-financed deals);  . These hypotheses are 
not mutually exclusive. 
The positive views predict that, due to the certification effect and reduced agency conflicts, all 
bank-affiliated deals (including parent-financed), as compared to stand-alone private equity deals, should: 
-  involve higher-quality targets,   
-  be financed at better terms to reflect higher quality,   
-  and experience more favorable ex-post outcomes.  
Under the negative views, target quality, financing terms, and ex-post outcomes should be the 
same or worse for bank-affiliated and parent-financed deals. In addition, if banks take advantage of credit  
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market conditions in financing their own equity deals, then parent-financed deals in particular should 
receive  advantageous  financing  terms  and  this  financing  advantage  should  be  concentrated  in  credit 
market peaks, even if these deals do not exhibit better ex-post performance.  
Our  evidence  on  balance  is  more  consistent  with  the  negative  views  and,  in  particular,  the 
concerns raised by Shleifer and Vishny (2010). Comparing bank-affiliated deals to stand-alone deals, we 
find  that  they  have  worse  financing  terms.  They  also  have  worse  ex-post  outcomes  (more  debt 
downgrades and fewer upgrades), especially for deals consummated during the peaks of the credit market 
cycle. Thus, this underperformance holds in excess of the overall cyclical underperformance documented 
for private equity deals in general (Kaplan and Stein (1993); Kaplan and Schoar (2005)). This evidence 
indicates that banks are not superior equity investors than regular private equity groups, and their equity 
investments (alone) do not provide certification for the quality of the deals. 
Comparing parent-financed deals with stand-alone deals, we find strong evidence that they enjoy 
significantly better financing terms, even though they do not exhibit better ex ante characteristics and ex 
post outcomes. All else equal, parent financing increases the loan amount by $577 million, increases the 
maturity by 3.9 years, and reduces the spread by 34 basis points. These effects are economically large 
considering that the average loan size is $613 million, the average maturity is 6.2 years, and the average 
spread is 318 basis points in our sample. Consistent with the notion that banks take advantage of loose 
credit market conditions in the financing of in-house deals, the superior non-pricing terms of parent-
financed deals are concentrated entirely in credit market peaks. This result is robust to the use of the 
inflow of funds to CLOs (an important funding source for private equity deals and arguably an exogenous 
source of variation in credit supply) as an instrument for the credit market conditions. Examining banks 
syndication behavior, we find that these are also the time periods that banks retain the lowest fractions of 
the  loans  backing  the  investments,  with  the  rest  syndicated  to  other  investors.  The  concentration  of 
superior terms in peak periods when banks retain the least of the loans suggests that the superior financing 
terms result from favorable credit supply conditions, rather than stronger certification. Finally, we also 
find  that  bank  involvement  in  private  equity—especially  their  role  as  lenders—generates  significant  
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cross-selling opportunities for banks. Although cross-selling does not explain the financing patterns by 
itself, it offers a rationale for banks’ pro-cyclical expansion in private equity by enabling them to capture 
more future revenues (while their risk exposures can be syndicated out).  
While we also find evidence that bank certification as lenders are associated with better financing 
terms,  the  cyclicality  of  parent-financing  terms  is  unexplained  by  these  effects.  The  time-varying 
component of our findings—the cyclical variation in financing terms and the performance of the deals (as 
compared to stand-alone private equity deals)—is important for interpreting our results. For example, 
while the certification hypotheses may also have time-varying predictions, they are of the wrong sign. If 
banks’ monitoring of management and incentive- alignment are enhanced when they invest in and finance 
more deals, we should observe better, not worse, outcomes among bank-affiliated and parent-financed 
deals consummated during peaks. But this is not the case. Thus, the collective set of evidence on parent-
financed deals indicates that market-timing (Shleifer and Vishny (2010)), as opposed to information about 
the borrower’s quality, is the most consistent explanation for banks’ cyclical expansion in private equity.
4  
The debate about the Volcker Rule harkens back to many of the same issues raised in earlier 
discussions about the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Does combining different activities within the same 
bank benefit from banks’ role as information intermediaries? Or does it create conflicts of interest that 
benefit the banks at the expense of others? While the literature has provided ample evidence on the Glass-
Steagall Act (Kroszner and Rajan (1994); Puri (1996); Gande, et al. (1997); Drucker and Puri (2005)), it 
has  been  silent  on  the  factors  influencing  the  desirability  of  combining  lending  and  private  equity 
investing. By providing the first set of evidence on the topic, our paper takes a step towards filling a gap 
in the literature. 
                                                           
4 It is also important to view the different pieces of the evidence jointly. Certification can be fully consistent with 
cyclical advantages in financing terms. But together with the fact that these better loan terms are not matched by 
better outcomes in peak  years, and that they are obtained  when banks retain the lowest  fractions of the loans 
(syndicating most out), they are more consistent with banks’ timing of credit market conditions in the financing of 
in-house equity investments than with certification.   
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We interpret the collective set of time-series patterns as more consistent with the negative views 
of the banks’ involvement in private equity than the positive ones. But we also show that banks have a 
certification role as lenders (even though we argue that it does not explain the cyclical patterns that we 
document.)  The  co-existence  of  banks’  timing  of  the  credit  market  and  certification  highlights  the 
complexity in drawing policy implications. The evidence of value-enhancing certification points to the 
fact that bluntly curbing the banks’ involvement in private equity may not be a first-best solution. More 
broadly, that assessment of the Volcker Rule should also factor in the externalities (positive and negative) 
associated  with  bank  involvement,  and  the  extent  to  which  bank-affiliated  private  equity  deals  are 
substitutes  for  or  complements  to  deals  that  otherwise  would  be  done  by  stand-alone  private  equity 
groups. As ours is the first set of empirical evidence regarding the effects of combining banking with 
private  equity  investing,  we  defer  the  optimal  regulatory  design  and  other  broader  issues  to  future 
research.  
1.  Banks and Private Equity 
Private equity firms use privately raised capital to buy stakes in companies and hope to realize a 
profit when they sell (or exit) these investments. The equity capital of private equity funds is raised from 
limited partners (LPs); investment decisions are made by general partners (GPs). In the case of a bank-
affiliated private equity fund, the parent bank often acts as an anchor LP to the fund, contributing as much 
as 50% of the fund’s equity (Hardymon, Lerner, and Leamon (2004)). 
In addition to equity, a typical private equity transaction includes several layers of debt. Over the 
past two decades, debt represented on average 60-70% of the capital structure in leveraged buyouts and 
reached as high as 80% in 2006 and early 2007. Since the mid-1980s, syndicated bank debt has been an 
important source of funding in this market. Although the loan issued in conjunction with a transaction 
typically has recourse only to the target (portfolio firm), the private equity firm is referred to as the 
“financial sponsor”. Figure 2, Panel A illustrates a typical transaction done by a stand-alone (i.e., non-
bank-affiliated) private equity group. The private equity sponsor (Blackstone, in this case) invests in the  
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equity stake of the target company; the bank (Citi in this case) arranges the debt used in the transaction. In 
contrast, Panel B of Figure 2 illustrates a bank-affiliated transaction. Here, the private equity sponsor is 
Goldman Sachs Capital, a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs. Thus, the difference between a bank-affiliated 
private equity deal and a stand-alone deal is whether the private equity sponsor has a bank (holding 
company) as a parent. In our analysis, we use a zero-one variable BANK AFFILIATED to indicate this 
difference. Our measure of affiliation is independent of the size of the parent bank’s equity contribution 
as a LP.  
As noted above, the parent bank can act as a lead bank in the lending syndicate.
5 Panel C of 
Figure 2 illustrates this scenario. Here, the private equity sponsor is Goldman Sachs Capital, a subsidiary 
of Goldman Sachs. But in addition, Goldman Sachs (the parent bank) leads the loan syndicate. We use a 
zero-one dummy PARENT FINANCED to indicate these deals. Of the bank-affiliated deals in our sample, 
roughly one-third is parent financed. Notice that Panels A, B, and C of Figure  2 illustrate the three 
possible categories of transactions; by definition, it is not possible for a stand-alone private equity deal to 
be parent financed. 
[FIGURE 2] 
In general, bank-affiliated transactions are similar to stand-alone transactions in many respects, 
such as the target  industry,  deal  characteristics,  and  the  investors’ evaluation  processes. We provide 
evidence on this similarity in the next section. In addition, we conducted interviews with a number of 
senior private equity professionals from four different firms who have worked in bank-affiliated as well 
as stand-alone private equity firms. The consensus emerging from these interviews is that the transactions 
undertaken by bank-affiliated and large independent private equity groups are similar: the target industry, 
characteristics, and the investors’ evaluation processes do not differ materially. In fact, these investors 
                                                           
5 Loans in our sample are syndicated. To capture the leading role a bank plays in the lending syndicate, we count a 
bank as a lead bank if it is either the lead arranger or co-arranger for the loan. In only one case the parent bank acted 
as  a  “participant”  on  the  lending  syndicate.  We  did  not  count  this  case  as  parent-financed  deal  given  that 
“participant” role is typically not associated with a major funding commitment.   
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often compete for the same deal. This alleviates the concern that bank-affiliated and stand-alone deals are 
not comparable due to selection bias.  
Although it is unlikely that the effects identified in this paper are driven by the GP/LP structure of 
the bank-affiliated firms, it is worth noting that GP compensation in bank-affiliated funds is similar to that 
in  stand-alone  funds.  As  an  example,  Hardymon,  Lerner,  and  Leamon  (2004)  provide  a  detailed 
description of the incentives for Montagu Private Equity while it was affiliated with HSBC. They indicate 
that, while bonuses to staff (assistants and junior associates) in bank-affiliated funds were paid by the 
parent, GP compensation was from fees and carry, just as in stand-alone funds; the main difference being 
that bank-affiliated GPs received only a portion of the total carry (87.5% for Montagu), with the rest 
going to the parent. Importantly, just as in stand-alone funds, compensation of managing partners for 
bank-affiliated private equity firms depends on the performance of the fund (fees and carry), and not on 
the performance of the parent bank. 
2.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We compile a sample of U.S. private equity transactions between 1983 and 2009 from Standard and 
Poor’s Capital IQ. Information on borrowing terms for a subset of the deals is collected from Reuters’ 
LPC  DealScan  loan  database  (DealScan).  To  examine  investment  outcomes,  we  further  collect  loan 
outcomes and (equity) exit information from various sources.  
Our sample includes leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and growth investments, but excludes venture 
capital and distressed investments. Capital IQ has tracked private equity deals on a world-wide basis since 
1999. Through extensive research, it attempts to “back fill” information about investments before 1999.
6 
Strömberg (2008) compares the Capital IQ LBO data during the 1980s with the samples in older LBO 
studies from other sources and estimates the Capital IQ coverage to be between 70% and 85% for this 
period. Due to the back filling, the Capital IQ sample is likely to be skewed towards larger deals before 
                                                           
6  Most  data  services  tracking  private  equity  investments  were  not  established  until  the  late  1990s.  The  most 
comprehensive  exception,  SDC  VentureXpert,  was  primarily  focused  on  capturing  venture  capital  investments 
(rather than private equity transactions) until the mid-1990s.  
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1999. This sampling feature creates a bias against finding a difference between bank-affiliated and stand-
alone deals because larger deals generally have better access to financing; the identity of the sponsor 
plays a smaller role. Thus the differences we document below are unlikely to be due to sampling biases. 
DealScan primarily covers syndicated loans. Our dataset covers the period from 1988 through the 
end of 2008 (a period with two boom-bust cycles). We collect information on the borrower’s name, 
lenders’ names, private equity investor’s name, loan type, loan size, loan maturity, and loan spread paid 
over the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). For a sub-sample of deals, we also have information 
on the maximum debt as a multiple of EBITDA allowed under the loan contract, an important financial 
covenant. We consolidate the information at the loan level. For a given transaction, we look at the terms 
on the first-lien term loan facilities. All first-lien tranches (including Term loan A and Term loan B) share 
seniority, collateral, and covenant structure, so the spread on all the senior tranches is typically the same. 
Consistent with the literature (e.g., Demiroglu and James (2010), and Ivashina and Kovner (2011)), we 
look at the “all-in-drawn” spread, which includes fees paid to the lending syndicate (such as an annual 
fee) and excludes upfront fees (typically a flat 2% rate) paid directly to the lead arranger. We then match 
the DealScan data with the Capital IQ transactions data by borrower name, private equity investor name, 
and  time  of  the  transaction.  Finally,  in  the  instances  where  DealScan  has  multiple  listings  for  a 
transaction, we select the first chronological loan associated with that transaction, excluding bridge loans 
and follow-on transactions or refinancings. We do this because our focus is the financing conditions at the 
time of the deal closing, rather than the dynamics of debt renegotiation.  
We are able to match 2,105 deals from Capital IQ with financing information from DealScan. 
The match is imperfect because not all transactions are backed by large—and, therefore, syndicated—
loans, which is the primary focus of DealScan.
7 Overall, the matched sample is biased toward large 
                                                           
7 The DealScan data are collected from Reuters contributors and is primarily used by market participants as a 
benchmark for loan terms and for construction of league tables. If the loan is not syndicated, it is unlikely to be 
included. Because LBOs have other sources of financing in addition to the syndicated loan market, the loan amounts 
in the DealScan data are lower bounds of total deal leverages. However this effect should be symmetric for all deals, 
and thus does not introduce bias to our study.  
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transactions, but there is no reason to believe that this affects the bank-affiliated and stand-alone samples 
differently. The sample size and deal characteristics in our merged sample are comparable to other studies 
that rely on the DealScan data (Axelson, et al. (2008); Ivashina and Kovner (2011)). 
   Table 1 reports investment activities of all 14 bank-affiliated groups and the top 15 stand-alone 
groups. The ranking is based on total dollar amount of investments, using the larger Capital IQ sample 
(before matching with DealScan). Bank-affiliated groups are (surprisingly) large players in the private 
equity market: Between 1983 and 2009, they were involved in 2,759 deals totaling over $730 billion in 
transaction value, while stand-alone groups took part in 7,247 deals totaling $1,849 billion in transaction 
value. By either measure, bank-affiliated groups account for nearly 30% of the overall private equity 
market.
8 This percentage is strikingly similar to that reported by Lopez -de-Silanes, et al. (2011), where 
the authors find that roughly one-third of the investments in their global private equity dataset are done by 
bank-affiliated private equity groups (subsidiaries of banking and finance companies). The consistency in 
this percentage between two separate samples indicates that banks’ significant involvement in private 
equity is an important aspect of private equity investing, although little understood to date.  
Activity in both the bank-affiliated and stand-alone samples is concentrated. In the bank-affiliated 
sample, Goldman Sachs Capital Partners alone accounts for 36% of the total transaction values, and the 
top five groups account for 83% of the total. In the stand-alone sample, the top group KKR accounts for 
15% of the total transaction values, and the top five groups account for over half.  
[TABLE 1] 
Table 2 reports transaction and target characteristics of the overall sample, as well as the stand-
alone, bank-affiliated, and parent-financed sub-samples. We note that bank-affiliated deals are similar to 
stand-alone deals along most dimensions. They are similar in target size (measured either by total assets 
or  total  sales),  capital  structure  (Debt/Assets,  Debt/EBITDA,  and  Cash/Assets  ratios),  and  operating 
                                                           
8 In this set of calculations, each sponsor gets full credit for a deal if multiple sponsors are involved. In separate 
(unreported) calculations where we only count deals with sole sponsors, we find that affiliated groups account for 
30.55% of all deals and 29.82% of total transaction value.  
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performance  (EBITDA/Assets  and  Net  Income/Sales  ratios).  They  are  also  similar  in  transaction 
characteristics,  such as transaction  size  and the  portion  of  cash  used in payments. The  only  notable 
difference is that bank-affiliated deals seem to be done at lower valuations (EV/EBITDA and Equity/Net 
Income ratios). In unreported analysis, we also find that the industry distributions of the two samples are 
similar.  These  comparisons  confirm  the  view  heard  from  practitioners  that  bank-affiliated  deals  are 
generally not very different from stand-alone deals, and they also alleviate sample-selection concerns.  
Parent-financed deals stand out from the rest of the sample. They are significantly larger (in both 
transaction size and firm size), tend to be less-leveraged prior to the transaction (lower Debt/Asset ratio), 
have less liquidity on the balance sheet (lower Cash/Assets ratio), and tend to be transacted at higher 
EV/EBITDA ratios than stand-alone deals. These patterns suggest that banks take on the financing of 
large in-house deals. Despite their size, the statistics suggest that they tend to be financed at better terms.
9 
We analyze banks’ involvement in private equity investing and the financing of the deals more rigorously 
in the next section. 
[TABLE 2] 
3.  Results 
3.1   Bank affiliation and parent financing 
Table 3 examines the determinants of bank-affiliated deals (BANK AFFILIATED) and parent-financed 
deals (PARENT FINANCED) in a multinomial logit setting. The omitted category is stand-alone deals; 
thus, these regressions estimate the odds that a deal will be bank-affiliated only or also parent-financed, 
relative to this base case.
10 In light of the hyp otheses discussed in the Introduction, we are especially 
                                                           
9 Our finding that parent-financed deals enjoy better financing terms and are transacted at higher EV/EBITDA 
multiples is consistent with Axelson et al. (2012), which documents that investors pay higher EV/EBITDA multiples 
for deals when debt is cheap. 
10 The use of a multinomial logit regression assumes that the bank decides simultaneously whether to be a private 
equity  sponsor  of  a  deal  and  whether  to  also  be  a  syndicate  leader.  We  thank  an  anonymous  referee  for  this 
suggestion. In a previous draft, we estimated separate probit regressions, which assume that these two decisions are 
made separately. Although that analysis operates under different assumptions, the main qualitative conclusion is 
similar to that reported here.  
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interested in how credit-market conditions influence banks’ involvement in private equity. The negative 
views—maximization of growth and volatility (in the case of bank-affiliation), and market-timing (in the 
case of parent-financing)—suggest that banks will be more involved in private equity deals during peaks 
of the credit market.  
We use two measures of market conditions. The first is an indicator variable PEAK YEAR which 
equals 1 for 1985-1989, 1998-2000, and 2005-2007, corresponding to expansion periods of the private 
equity market.
11 As a second, continuous measure of the credit -market conditions, we use the quarterly 
CLO fund flow, scaled by total term loan (as opposed to revolving lines) issuanc e (CLO FUND FLOW). 
The rationale for this measure is the following. Since the late 1990s, CLOs are the largest investor group 
in the primary leveraged credit market.
12 Shivdasani and Wang (2011) argue that supply of funds from 
CLOs was the main driver behind the recent LBO boom. Because CLOs use term loans as the primary 
underlying collateral, the ratio of CLO flow relative to total loan issuance is a proxy for the imbalance 
between credit supply from CLOs and credit demand by borrowers; an increase in this ratio indicates a 
positive shock to the institutional fund supply in the leveraged credit market. Since most of the capital 
raised by CLOs is invested in loans by definition, this is a particularly good proxy for the fluctuations in 
credit supply. In addition,  aggregate trends in CLO fund flow and total loan issuance are likely to be 
exogenous to any particular transaction or any particular bank. The drawback is that we have these data 
only for the period from 2001 to 2008; thus our evidence using this proxy is based on a smaller sample.
13  
                                                           
11 We use annual private equity investments data from SDC. A year is considered a peak year if it saw a large 
amount of total investment, and represents a positive year-on-year growth in total investments compared to the last 
year. The cutoff for a “large” amount of total investments is $3 billion for the 80’s; $30 billion for the 90’s (a ten-
fold increase compared to the earlier decade), and $45 billion for the current decade (a 50% increase from the earlier 
decade). These cutoffs are chosen by examining the trend of investments in adjacent years. 
12 According to Standard & Poor’s, between 2000 and 2006 CLOs represented 65% of the institutional investors’ 
buying of syndicated leveraged loans on the primary market. 
13 We also examined an alternative market condition measure: the credit tightening measur e based on Senior Loan 
Officer  Opinion  Survey  (www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/).  Results  (unreported)  using  this 
alternative measure are qualitatively similar to those reported in this paper. The results using the survey data have 
weaker statistical power, which is not surprising given that CLO fund flow directly influenc es  LBO financing 
whereas the survey data reflects overall bank lending conditions.  
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Other explanatory variables include the number of investors (some deals involve multiple equity 
sponsors, i.e., “club deals”), the credit quality of the target (investment-grade), the (log of) transaction 
value, a measure of valuation (the EV/EBITDA ratio), the (log of) target assets, and a measure of target 
operations (EBITDA/sales).  
Panel A reports our baseline results. We find that bank affiliation (relative to stand-alone deals) is 
not strongly affected by the credit-market condition variables—PEAK YEAR and CLO FUND FLOW. We 
also note that the independent variables are generally insignificant in explaining bank-affiliation relative 
to stand-alone deals, again suggesting similarities between the two samples. However, parent-financing is 
strongly related to credit-market conditions: Both the PEAK YEAR and CLO FUND FLOW variables 
significantly predict PARENT FINANCED. Another salient observation is that parent financing is strongly 
driven  by  the  size  of  the  deal.  The  (log  of)  transaction  size  is  a  significant  predictor  for  PARENT 
FINANCED in both specifications; the number of investors (indicating club deals, which are almost by 
definition large) is also significant.  
In  Panel  B,  we  add  a  variable  TARGET-BANK  RELATIONSHIP  and  its interaction  with the 
credit-market condition variables to examine the role played by bank information, and whether the effects 
of the credit-market condition variables are driven by this information (the interaction term). Specifically, 
following Ivashina and Kovner (2011), for a given transaction, TARGET-BANK RELATIONSHIP is the 
dollar value of loans in the previous five years arranged by the same lead bank for the target divided by 
the total dollar value of all loans received by the target. Thus, it measures the historical importance of the 
bank as a financier to the target. We are interested in this variable because according to the positive view 
of bank certification, banks may use information acquired from past interactions about the target to make 
(better) equity investment and financing decisions.  
We find that bank information, proxied for by a past relationship between the target and the bank, 
has no explanatory power for either bank affiliation or parent financing. In contrast, PEAK YEAR and 
CLO FUND FLOW remain strong predictors of parent financing. 
 [TABLE 3]  
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In summary, the result that stands out from this analysis is that parent financing is driven by 
credit market cyclicality and transaction size: it is more likely to occur for large deals during the peaks of 
the market. On the other hand, bank information (proxied for by past target-bank interactions) does not 
seem significant in explaining banks’ involvement in private equity transactions. 
3.2 Financing terms 
Table 4 reports regression analyses of four financing term variables at the time of loan origination: total 
loan amount, maturity, total spread paid over LIBOR, and the maximum debt as a multiple of EBITDA 
allowed by the covenants.
14 All else equal, larger loan amounts indicate more availability of financing, an 
important factor for private equity deals. Lower spreads indicate a lower cost of capital. Cotter and Peck 
(2001) argue that shorter maturity, by placing higher payment burdens on the firm, is a substitute for more 
stringent covenants. Thus longer maturity indicates looser, or more favorable, non -pricing terms for the 
borrower. Finally, a higher maximum debt-to-EBITDA ratio indicates looser covenant terms because it 
provides more financial flexibility to the firm.  
  The main explanatory variables are the indicator variable for bank -affiliated deals ( BANK 
AFFILIATED) and parent-financed deals (PARENT FINANCED). The omitted category in this regression 
is stand-alone deals.  
Control variables include an indicator for a mixed type deal (i.e., a “club deal” backed by at least 
one bank-affiliated private equity group and one stand-alone group), the credit rating of the deal, and deal 
and firm characteristics relevant for loan pricing, such as the (log of) transaction value, the ratio of the 
target firm’s enterprise value to EBITDA, firm size (measured as the log of the target’s assets), and the 
ratio of the firm’s EBITDA to sales. For firms without complete financial data, we include a dummy, thus 
                                                           
14 Following Ivashina and Kovner (2011), we focus on the Maximum Debt-to-EBITDA covenant. They identify this 
particular covenant as the most important in the context of LBOs. While ideally one would like to focus on the 
degree to which the financial covenants are binding, this is difficult to do in the context of the LBOs due to the 
private nature of the transactions.   
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allowing for a shift in the intercept for this subgroup. Identification of the coefficients on the financial 
variables is driven by the subsample with the available data. We also include sector and year fixed effects.  
[TABLE 4] 
Table  4  indicates  that,  in  general,  bank-affiliated  deals  have  slightly  worse  financing  terms 
compared to stand-alone deals. Loan amount is smaller (though insignificant), loan maturities are shorter, 
and spreads are higher (significant at 10%). The parent-financed deals, in contrast, enjoy significantly 
better financing. Parent financing increases the loan amount by $577 million, increases the maturity by 
3.9 years, and reduces the spread by 34 basis points. These effects are economically large considering that 
the average loan size is $613 million, the average maturity is 6.2 years, and the average spread is 318 
basis points in our sample. The effect on the maximum Debt/EBITDA covenant is insignificant, possibly 
because of the small sample for this data item, but the result still indicates that parent-financed deals 
enjoy higher maximum Debt/EBITDA ratios. 
In summary, bank-affiliated deals are financed at slightly worse terms compared to stand-alone 
deals, but parent-financed deals enjoy significantly better terms. Earlier literature indicates that private 
equity groups have certification effects (e.g., Cao and Lerner (2009), Demiroglu and James (2010)). If 
such effects are reflected in financing terms, the worse terms on bank-affiliated deals suggest that the 
market does not perceive bank-affiliated groups to make superior investments compared to stand-alone 
groups, despite the possibility of useful information flows from other bank divisions. This is inconsistent 
with bank-affiliated groups’ certification role as equity investors.
15   
The superior financing terms associated with parent  financing, on the other hand,  can still be 
consistent with both  the positive views and the negative views. The positive views contain two main 
elements. The first is banks’ certification role as debt financiers: parent banks’ decision to lead the loan 
syndicate can be a positive signal to other debt investors. The second is that banks’ exposure to debt in 
                                                           
15 Additional direct evidence on bank-affiliated groups’ certification as equity investors includes ex post outcome 
information, which we present below. Another channel of equity-investor certification is the investors’ reputation in 
the  private  equity  market.  Using  size  and  experience  as  reputation  measures  (similar  to  Demiroglu  and  James 
(2010)), our main results do not change after controlling for investor reputation (unreported for brevity).   
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addition to equity alleviates agency conflicts. The negative views suggest that the improved financing 
terms reflect banks’ ability to time the credit market, and it is unrelated to loan quality. We address these 
hypotheses in the next sections.  
 
3.3 Certification channels 
To  understand  whether  the  superior  financing  enjoyed  by  parent-financed  deals  is  due  to  the  bank 
certification role in the debt market, we directly examine two channels of certification.  
The  first  channel  is  bank  information.  Banks  acquire  information  from  past  interactions  and 
monitoring of firms. If banks rely on this information to lead loan syndicates for high-quality firms, their 
decision to be a syndicate leader should be a positive signal to external debt investors and can result in 
better terms. A natural proxy for bank certification would be a measure of past target-bank relationships. 
For  this,  we  use  TARGET-BANK  RELATIONSHIP,  which  measures  the  fraction  of  the  target  firm’s 
borrowing in the past five years that comes from the bank. The second channel of certification is bank 
reputation. If a bank that is reputable in the LBO lending market decides to lead the financing for a deal, 
the bank’s reputation concerns vis-à-vis credit market investors should serve a certification role for the 
quality  of  the  loan  being  syndicated.  Similar  effects  have  been  documented  by  Fang  (2005)  for 
underwriters in the bond underwriting markets. To capture bank reputation in the LBO financing market, 
we use an indicator for the top five banks in terms of total dollar amount of LBO lending from Shivdasani 
and Wang (2011).
16 
Our empirical strategy for testing each channel is to introduce each proxy for certification into the 
regression equation and interact it with the PARENT FINANCED dummy. If syndicate leaders have a 
certification role that arises from strong past relationships with the target or from the banks’ reputation, 
then the relationship and reputation variables should predict superior financing terms. Moreover, if the 
better  terms  associated  with  parent  financing  are  due  to  certification,  we  should  see  the  interaction 
                                                           
16 The top five banks are: Citigroup, JP Morgan, Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, and Credit Suisse.  
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between the certification proxies and parent financing to predict superior terms. Table 5 reports these 
tests. Panel A examines target-bank relationship, and Panel B examines bank reputation in the LBO 
lending markets. For brevity, we report key coefficients only; the empirical specifications are otherwise 
identical to Table 4.  
Consistent with prior literature, we find that a stronger target-bank relationship is associated with 
significantly  larger  loan  amount  and  lower  spreads.
17  This  supports a  certification function by loan 
syndicate leaders that have strong relationships with borrowers. However, the superior financing terms 
associated with parent financing are  not explained by this channel: the interaction between  PARENT 
FINANCED and TARGET-BANK RELATIONSHIP is weak or of the wrong sign, while the coefficients on 
PARENT FINANCING hardly change, indicating that the parent-financing effect does not act through the 
relationship/superior information channel. Similarly, Panel B shows that lead banks’ reputation in the 
LBO financing markets does not explain the superior financing terms enjoyed by parent-financed deals. 
Thus, our evidence suggests that, while the bank-firm relationship is a channel of certification and 
is related to better financing terms, the parent-financing “advantage” in loan terms is not explained by this 
effect, as it remains large and significant after explicitly controlling for certification channels.  
[TABLE 5] 
3.4 Cyclicality of financing terms 
To examine the alternative explanation for the superior financing terms associated with parent financing, 
namely, banks’ timing of the credit market, we investigate the cyclicality of financing terms. The market 
timing hypothesis maintains that banks time the credit market to finance more in-house deals when credit 
market conditions are favorable. If this is the case, we expect the superior financing terms associated with 
parent financing to be concentrated during those periods.
18  
                                                           
17 In unreported analysis, when we include the target-bank relationship variable alone, i.e., without its interaction 
term with parent financing, we find that relationship significantly predicts all four financing term variables. 
18 Cyclicality in financing terms is difficult to reconcile with certification. One way for the certification hypothesis 
to predict a pro-cyclical improvement in financing terms would be that during peaks of the market, ban ks finance 
  
19 
 
Our approach to examining this hypothesis is the same as for the certification hypothesis. We 
introduce  two  measures  of  credit  market  conditions—the  indicator  variable  PEAK  YEAR  and  the 
continuous measure CLO FUND FLOW—and interact them with key explanatory variables. The main 
inference comes from the interaction between PARENT FINANCED and these variables. Because the 
previous section shows that target-bank relationship is a channel of certification (though it does not 
explain the parent financing effect), we also include TARGET-BANK RELATIONSHIP and its interaction 
with the credit condition variables to allow for time-varying certification arising from bank information. 
Results are reported in Table 6.  
[TABLE 6] 
Panel A shows that the superior financing terms enjoyed by parent-financed deals concentrate in 
market  peaks.  The  interaction  term  between  PARENT  FINANCED  and  PEAK  YEAR  is  positive  and 
significant  in  the  loan  amount,  maturity,  and  maximum  debt-to-EBITDA  regressions.  Notably,  the 
explanatory  power  of  PARENT  FINANCED  alone  disappears,  and  its  effect  loads  entirely  on  the 
interaction term. Loan spreads are no longer significantly reduced by the parent bank’s presence in the 
lending syndicate: while the coefficients on both PARENT FINANCED and its interaction with PEAK 
YEAR are still negative, they are statistically insignificant. Results in Panel B—which uses the ratio of 
one-quarter lagged CLO fund flow to total term loan issuance (CLO FUND FLOW) as the measure for 
market conditions—are qualitatively identical to Panel A: the effect of parent financing on the ability to 
borrow more, at longer maturities, and under looser covenants is concentrated in periods when this ratio is 
high, which indicates times that institutional fund supply to the leveraged credit market is high.
19 Thus, 
consistent with the market timing hypothesis, we find that the superior financing terms associated with 
parent financing are concentrated only in credit market peaks. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
more in-house deals in which the banks have had strong past relationships with the target firms. However, we have 
shown in Table IV that this is not the case: Target-bank relationship does not drive parent financing in a pro-cyclical 
fashion.   
19 In terms of economic magnitudes, our estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in  CLO FUND 
FLOW leads to additional borrowing of $443 million, a longer maturity by 2 years, and an increase of 0.9 in the 
maximum Debt/EBITDA ratio allowed, for parent-financed deals compared to stand-alone deals.  
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One concern is that the time-varying pattern in financing terms may be explained by a few banks’ 
dominance in LBO lending and structured financing, rather than by parent financing. The previous section 
shows that the overall (static) effect of parent financing is not explained by this. However, Shivdasani and 
Wang (2011) find that banks active in structured credit markets lent more to LBO transactions and priced 
LBO loans more aggressively than other lenders during the recent LBO boom. To check the possibility 
that the time-varying pattern in financing terms is driven by a few large banks, we expand the regression 
by adding banks’ rankings in the LBO and structured credit market from Shivdasani and Wang (2011) 
and the interaction terms with the credit condition variables. The cyclical effect associated with parent 
financing is hardly changed by the inclusion of these variables (unreported). 
Another concern is that the time-varying effect on parent financing may be driven by the size or 
reputation of private equity sponsors. Demiroglu and James (2010) and Ivashina and Kovner (2011) find 
that private equity firms that are bigger and more reputable are more active during credit expansions. To 
control for this, we expand the regression by including private equity firms’ size and its interaction with 
the credit condition variables. While private equity firms’ size is related to better terms, the cyclicality 
associated with parent financing remains unaffected (unreported).
20  
Overall, we find a robust pattern that transactions are financed at better terms when the financing 
comes through the parent bank,  and this effect is concentrated only  during the peaks of the credit 
market.
21 This time-varying pattern is not explained by banks’ reputation as LBO lenders or as private 
equity investors, nor is it explained by bank-target relationships, a source of superior information. In other 
words, there is a cyclical advantage in financing terms related specifically to parent financing. These 
findings are consistent with the market timing hypothesis but difficult to reconcile with certification 
                                                           
20 We also looked at whether bank-affiliated funds tend to have more partners with financial engineering abilities. 
Following Acharya et al. (2013), we collected data on partners’ backgrounds from Capital IQ. We find that only 
14% of the partner’s in bank-affiliated funds have operational (non-financial) background, compared to 27% in 
stand-alone funds. The difference however is statistically and economically small, reflecting 2-3 people, to explain 
our findings. More broadly, such skill difference cannot explain why only parent-financed deals, and not all bank-
affiliated deals, enjoy superior financing terms.  
21 There is some evidence that the cyclicality of financing terms is stronger in the non-commercial bank sample.   
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arguments. In the next two subsections, we provide further evidence by examining ex post outcomes and 
banks’ syndication patterns.  
3.5 Ex-post outcomes 
To distinguish further between the positive and negative views, we examine the outcomes of the loans 
backing the transactions as well as the equity investments.
22 The loan outcomes are particularly relevant 
for the certification hypotheses not only because they can be juxtaposed with the ex -ante loan terms, but 
also because certification is an externality of bank information which has impacts on other investors (in 
this case, debt investors).  The loan outcomes data are from  Reuters Gold Sheets. We focus on credit 
upgrades  and  downgrades  subsequent  to  the  original  placeme nt.  Exit  information  on  the  equity 
investments combines data from Str ömberg (2008) and hand -collected information on recent IPOs, 
bankruptcies, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) through January 2010 from Capital IQ and SDC 
Platinum. Table 7 compares outcomes of stand-alone deals, bank-affiliated deals, and parent -financed 
deals. We present the results for all years, peak years, and non -peak years. Table 8 presents the same 
results in the regression setting. Each regression incorporates the standard set of controls used throughout 
the paper.  
We find that loans backing bank-affiliated deals are significantly more likely to be downgraded 
and less likely to be upgraded than stand -alone deals: 23% of loans backing bank -affiliated deals are 
upgraded and 61% are downgraded, compared to 34% upgrades and 48% downgrades for loans backing 
stand-alone deals. These differences are significant at the 1% level and concentrated in peak -year deals. 
On the equity side, the two samples have similar outcomes, but bank -affiliated deals are slightly more 
likely to experience bankruptcy than stand -alone deals (7% versus 5%; the difference is marginally 
significant at the 10% level). The fact that loan outcomes for bank-affiliated deals are significantly worse 
than stand-alone deals is consistent with their worse ex -ante financing terms. Together, these results 
                                                           
22 Prior literature, for example, Kroszner and Rajan (1994) and Puri (1994), has examined ex-post performance to 
distinguish between banks’ certification role versus conflicts of interest in the security underwriting context. The 
rationale for our analysis is similar to these papers.  
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clearly indicate that banks are not superior equity investors and their equity investments do not confer 
certification effects. 
Turning  to  the  comparison  between  parent-financed  deals  and  stand-alone  deals  (differences 
reported in the last column), we find that the two samples have similar loan up/down-grade patterns 
whether it is peak or non-peak years. On the equity side, parent-financed deals seem to be more likely to 
exit through an IPO and less likely to go through a trade-sale, but these differences are concentrated in 
non-peak  periods.  Overall,  the  clear  conclusion  is  that  parent-financed  deals  do  not  exhibit  better 
outcomes than stand-alone deals, especially among peak-year deals. This is at odds with the significantly 
better financing terms that parent-financed deals enjoy in peak years, and suggest that the better loan 
terms reflects banks’ timing of credit supply conditions more than deal quality.  
These results are robust when we use regression analysis (Table 8). For example, Panel A of the 
table shows that bank-affiliated deals are more (less) likely to experience loan downgrades (upgrades), 
especially for peak-year deals. Parent-financed deals have similar loan outcomes compared to stand-alone 
deals. Panel B shows that bank-affiliated deals are more likely to experience bankruptcy, especially in 
peak years. Parent-financed deals are more likely to have an IPO exit, but this effect is driven by non-
peak years. Our estimation also shows that peak year investments are associated with significantly fewer 
IPO exits and more bankruptcies, consistent with the cyclical underperformance of private equity well-
documented before (e.g., Kaplan and Stein (1993); Kaplan and Schoar (2005)).  
 [TABLES 7 & 8] 
  Juxtaposed with results in the previous two sub-sections, these outcome patterns provide further 
support  to  the  negative  views.  The  fact  that  bank-affiliated  deals—especially  peak-year  deals—
underperform stand-alone deals, is inconsistent with banks as superior equity investors. Indeed, it is more 
consistent with the concerns about volatility/growth maximization. The fact that parent-financed deals 
perform no better than stand-alone deals while enjoying superior financing terms in peak years is hard to 
reconcile  with  certification  or  reduced  debt/equity  conflicts.  Instead,  it  points  to  an  improvement  in 
financing  terms  that  is  unrelated  to  deal  quality,  as  measured  by  ex-post  performance.  Such  an  
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unexplained improvement of financing terms is consistent with the notion that banks are able to time the 
credit  market  and  take  advantage  of  favorable  credit  supply  conditions  in  the  financing  of  in-house 
deals.
23  
3.6 Share of the loan retained by the parent bank 
In the final examination of time-varying patterns, we analyze parent banks’ capital commitments to the 
deals  they  fund.  As  noted  before,  loans  backing  private  equity  transactions  are  syndicated,  that  is, 
arranged by banks but funded largely by other syndicate participants. Banks retain a fraction of the loans, 
off-loading capital requirements and credit risks to other investors. In this setting, asymmetric information 
can lead to a lemon’s problem. Theory and empirical evidence indicate that a larger share retained by the 
bank should serve as a positive signal and should help resolve  the asymmetric information problem 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976); Gorton and Pennacchi (1995); Gopalan et al. (2011)). In the case of parent 
financing, a larger share of the loan retained by the bank also aligns debt and equity interests, reducing 
agency  conflicts  (Jiang,  et  al.  (2010)).  We  have  shown  in  the  previous  section  that  parent-financed 
transactions enjoy better financing terms during credit market booms. For this to be consistent with either 
the certification hypothesis or the reduction of debt/equity conflicts, we would expect the portion retained 
by the parent bank to follow a pro-cyclical pattern. However, if these better terms come from banks’ 
timing of the credit market and taking advantage of institutional investors’ appetite for risky loans, then 
the portion retained could follow a counter-cyclical pattern. Indeed, this would be consistent with Shleifer 
and Vishny (2010), which predicts that banks are more likely to syndicate transactions during booms.  
                                                           
23 We note that the contrast between bank-affiliated deals and parent-finance deals offer additional support for the 
positive  views  regarding  parent-financing.  Our  results  show  that  while  bank-affiliated  deals  significantly 
underperform  stand-alone  deals,  parent-financed  deals  do  not.  This  means  that  the  additional  debt  exposure 
improves on the equity-only exposure, which may result either from banks’ certification role in the debt market (as 
opposed  to  as  equity  investors),  or  from  better  alignment  of  debt-equity  interest  (Jiang  et  al.  2010).  Both  are 
elements of the positive view. This again suggests that bank involvement in private equity is complex, and so is the 
policy implication. As we noted in the Introduction, a blunt separation of bank involvement may therefore not be 
first-best and result in loss of potentially value-enhancing certification and interest-alignment.  
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We  use  two  proxies  for  the  banks’  “skin  in  the  game.”  The  first  proxy,  PARENT  BANK 
ALLOCATION is the share of the total loan financed by the parent bank (the rest being syndicated to other 
banks  or  institutional  investors).  Since  the  actual  value  of  this  variable  is  available  for  only  19 
transactions, we use estimated shares when the data are not available. The estimated share is the fitted 
value computed using coefficients from a regression of bank syndicate share on its syndicate role, the 
number  of  syndicate  members,  loan  size,  loan  type,  maturity,  and  year  fixed  effects  using  all  U.S. 
transactions available in DealScan where the dependent variable is not missing. Our second proxy is the 
total share of the loan funded by banks, as opposed to non-bank institutions such as special purpose 
vehicles, hedge funds, and mutual funds. In the context of Shleifer and Vishny (2010), the total banks’ 
share—including the parent bank—should be counter-cyclical.  
We regress these two proxies on market condition variables—the PEAK YEAR indicator and CLO 
FUND FLOW—in addition to a number of control variables and report the results in Table 9. The sample 
is limited to parent-financed deals. We find that both the estimated parent bank’s (individual) share, as 
well as all banks’ total share of the loans backing affiliated private equity transactions, are significantly 
lower during market peaks. The parent bank’s individual share is also significantly lower for highly 
priced deals, as measured by the ratio of enterprise value to EBITDA. These patterns are consistent with 
market timing and the notion that banks take advantage of their ability to raise more outside financing 
when market conditions are favorable, as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (2010). 
[TABLE 9] 
Putting  the  findings  of  this  section  together,  we  find  that  bank-affiliated  deals  have  worse 
financing terms and worse performance compared to stand-alone deals, especially among peak-year deals. 
Parent-financed  deals  enjoy  superior  financing  terms,  even  though  they  do  not  exhibit  superior 
performance. The financing advantage is concentrated in peaks of the credit market, when banks are most 
likely to lead the lending syndicate and yet retain the least portion of the loans. Collectively, we interpret 
these results as indicating that negative views—in particular, timing of credit market conditions—provide  
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more consistent explanations to banks’ pro-cyclical expansion in private equity than are positive views 
based on banks’ potential certification.  
3.7 Robustness tests 
One important concern is that our results could be driven by the endogenous nature of banks’ decisions to 
lead loan syndicates for their affiliated transactions. If banks’ decisions are driven by private information, 
the (unobserved) favorable deal characteristics could lead to superior financing terms. In fact, this type of 
selection is consistent with the certification hypothesis. Our findings in earlier sections provide counter-
evidence for this on economic grounds: the results that banks’ syndication decisions and the favorable 
financing terms are both highly cyclical while their retained portion is counter-cyclical are inconsistent 
with selection based on superior private information. Nevertheless, in this section we try to address this 
concern using identification techniques.  
Our idea is to use private equity groups that spun out of banks as an identification instrument. A 
spin-off breaks the formal connection between the private equity firm and the bank, but does not affect 
the type of the transactions undertaken. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the spin-offs were primarily 
driven  by  compensation  issues  unrelated  to  the  type  of  investments  undertaken.
24  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that the transactions undertaken by spun-off private equity firms before and after the 
firm became independent were essentially unchanged and the only true   change is bank affiliation. 
Comparing financing terms of deals done before and after the spin -offs thus can inform us whether 
formally belonging to a bank and being close to a loan syndicate desk helps improve financing terms, 
keeping constant the (unobserved) deal types.  
We look at transactions by the following eight  spun-off private equity groups (the parent bank 
and the year of the spin-off are in parentheses): Mercury Capital (Merrill Lynch, 2000), Lightyear Capital 
                                                           
24 Banks often received between 10% and 50% of the carried interest from affiliated groups prior to the spin-off, and 
a much smaller fraction (if any at all) afterwards (e.g., Hardymon, Lerner, and Leamon (2004)). Case study evidence 
and practitioners’ accounts suggest that the spin-off process is not associated with a dramatic change in the strategy 
or structure for private equity groups, which typically remained focused on their given area of specialization.  
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(UBS,  2002), MidOcean Partners (Deutsche Bank, 2003), Diamond Castle (CSFB, 2004), Metalmark 
Capital (Morgan Stanley, 2004), Avista Capital (CSFB, 2005), CCMP Capital Advisors (JP Morgan, 
2006), and Court Square Capital Partners (Citigroup, 2006).  
Results are reported in the appendix and  suggest that, after the spin-off, the financing terms 
deteriorate:  the  loan  amount  is  smaller,  loan  maturity  is  shorter,  and  the  spread  is  larger.  Though 
statistically insignificant, the economic magnitude is large, and the deterioration in financing terms after 
the spin-off events is consistent with bank affiliation playing an important role. Overall, these findings 
qualitatively suggest that  the organizational form of parent-financing per se appears related to better 
terms; alleviating the concern that the previously documented impact of the parent bank on the financing 
terms of in-house private equity deals is a result of selection biases. 
We conduct a host of additional robustness checks. For example, we examined our results in the 
commercial-bank and investment-bank sub-samples, as well as in sub-samples after dropping the top one, 
two, and three bank-affiliated funds. We also examined the robustness of our results by coding the two 
peak periods 1998-2000 and 2005-2007 separately.
25 We also dropped financial sector deals, for which 
bank-affiliated funds may have an advantage. The results reported here are robust to these changes. 
4.  Inter-Temporal Cross-Selling 
In this section, we examine whether banks’ involvement in private equity transactions helps them cross-
sell other banking services.
26 Cross-selling opportunities represent private benefits that accrue to the bank 
and provide an additional rationale for the bank to close an in -house deal. Since doing an extra deal is 
easier when credit-market conditions are favorable, this may help explain why we see more affiliated and 
parent-financed deals in such times.  
                                                           
25 When examining the two peaks separately, we find that the results on bigger loan amounts and longer maturities 
are primarily driven by the second peak period. The effect on covenant terms (maximum debt/EBITDA) is driven by 
the earlier peak period. This may be the case as many deals are covenant-lite in the more recent credit boom.  
26 Drucker and Puri (2005) and Hellmann, et al. (2008) provide evidence of banks’ cross-selling of lending services 
to investment banking and venture capital clients, respectively.   
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To  examine  inter-temporal  cross-selling,  we  identify  all  public  offerings  of  equity,  private 
placements of equity, and M&A transactions conducted by the target firms in our sample subsequent to 
the original private equity transaction. This is done by collecting equity issuance and M&A data from the 
SDC database. Similarly, we identify subsequent loans from the Dealscan database. We then analyze 
whether the bank that was either (the parent of) the original private equity sponsor or the syndicate leader 
has higher odds of winning these future banking mandates.  
Since we only observe the actual banks chosen, we create potential matches between banks and 
firms. For potential lenders, we use the top 15 banks that finance LBO transactions identified by Ivashina 
and Kovner (2011). For the underwriters and advisors, we use the top 15 investment banks over the 
sample period identified using SDC data. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a bank is chosen 
and 0 otherwise. The first key independent variable is SPONSOR’S PARENT, which takes the value of 1 
if the bank is the parent bank of the equity sponsor in the original private equity transaction. The second 
key variable is ORIGINAL LENDER, which equals 1 if the bank led the loan syndicate of the original 
private  equity  transaction  and  0  otherwise.  These  variables  capture  the  bank’s  roles  in  the  equity 
sponsorship and lending to the original private equity deal, respectively. 
  Table 10 shows that a bank’s involvement in private equity transactions—especially its role as a 
lender—significantly increases its odds of winning future investment banking businesses from the target. 
For example, being a lender in a private equity deal increases the bank’s odds of being chosen as a lender 
for subsequent loans by 60%, a very large magnitude economically. Lenders in private equity deals are 
also 17% and 9% more likely to be chosen as future M&A advisors and equity underwriters respectively 
by the target firm (reported as dF/dx in the table). These findings are consistent with prior evidence on 
banks’ ability to cross-sell (or to provide “one-stop shopping” for) financial services.  
[TABLE 10] 
  While cross-selling clearly makes private equity appealing to banks, it is unlikely to explain the 
better financing terms enjoyed by the parent-financed deals. While one can imagine a story where a bank 
would be willing to subsidize financing terms in order to facilitate deal closure and lock in the future fee  
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business, such an explanation is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the loans are primarily syndicated 
to institutional investors. In the syndicated market, financing terms are ultimately governed by the supply 
and  demand  of  funds  available  for  risky  credits  and  are  time-varying.  Cross-selling  does  provide, 
however, banks  with a rationale to expand their private equity activities when doing so is easy (i.e., at the 
peaks of the credit market): Even if these deals are of marginal quality, it is the investors that bear most of 
the risks; banks can potentially enjoy the private benefits of cross-selling. Thus, this section’s evidence on 
banks’  ability  to  cross-sell  reinforces  banks’  timing  of  the  credit  market  as  the  more  consistent 
explanation for the various findings in this paper.  
5.  Conclusion 
 In the wake of the financial crisis, the complexity of banks and their involvement in risky activities such 
as private equity (as well as hedge funds and proprietary trading) has become a key policy concern. The 
Volcker Rule in the recently passed Dodd Frank Act calls for significant cutbacks in these activities. 
However, despite the important policy implications, virtually no prior evidence exists on the extent of 
banks’ involvement in private equity, and the positive and negative effects of this involvement on the 
market and the economy. The empirical analysis in this paper takes a step towards filling this gap.  
Banks have numerous reasons to be interested in private equity activities. Combining banking 
with private equity investing not only allows banks to cross-sell other services to target firms, but also 
creates potential information synergies between different divisions of the bank (the traditional banking 
departments and the private equity division) that can lead to profitable investments for banks.  
From the policy standpoint, the key consideration is whether the positive externalities of banks’ 
involvement in private equity out-weigh the negative ones. On the positive side, the information synergy 
arising  from  combining  different  activities  can  lead  to  a  certification  effect  of  banks’  investments: 
Because banks have superior information on firms (due to past interactions and monitoring), a bank’s 
decision to invest in a company certifies the quality of the deal to other investors. This should result in 
better financing terms, and ultimately be reflected in better investment outcomes. On the negative side, a  
29 
 
bank may take advantage of its superior information about firms as well as the market conditions to make 
decisions that benefit the bank at the expense of other investors. These pros and cons parallel the issues in 
the debate about the Glass-Steagall Act in an earlier era. 
We empirically analyze whether the evidence is more supportive of the negative views or the 
positive ones. In addition to this main contribution, our analysis provides a first insight into the extent of 
banks’ engagement in private equity, a little understood aspect of the private equity market. An important 
nuance is that there are two different ways for banks to be involved in private equity deals: as the equity 
investors (which we call bank-affiliated deals), or as both the equity investor  and the debt financier 
(which we call parent-financed deals). The broad arguments about the positive (e.g., certification) and 
negative (e.g., agency problems and conflicts-of-interest) effects apply to both types of involvement, 
although the mechanisms and manifestations differ. We distinguish between the positive and negative 
views for both forms of involvement by examining the banks’ investment decisions, the financing of the 
deals, the ex-post outcomes of the investments, and the banks’ syndication patterns. We use stand-alone 
private equity deals as the benchmark in our analysis. 
We find that banks are surprisingly large players in the private equity market, accounting for 30% 
of transactions between 1983 and 2009, with transition values exceeding $700 billion. This is remarkable 
given that there are only a dozen or so bank-affiliated groups but many times more stand-alone firms. The 
30% figure is nearly identical to that documented separately by Lopez-de-Silanes, et al. (2011) using 
international data. This consistency suggests that bank involvement in private equity is a wide-spread and 
important phenomenon, if not a well understood one.  
Our analyses of the various hypotheses indicate that the negative views seem most consistent with 
the weight of our evidence. Bank-affiliated deals have worse financing terms compared to stand-alone 
deals and, consistent with this, they also exhibit worse ex-post outcomes, especially if consummated 
during  the  peaks  of  the  credit  market.  In  contrast,  parent-financed  deals  enjoy  significantly  better 
financing  terms  than  stand-alone  deals,  even  though  they  do  not  exhibit  better  ex  post  outcomes. 
Importantly, the financing advantage associated with parent financing is concentrated in the peaks of the  
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credit market when credit conditions are loose, but these are precisely the times when banks retain the 
lowest portion of the loans (hence risks) themselves. Thus, our interpretation is that the improvement in 
financing terms is better explained by banks’ successful timing of the credit market in the financing of in-
house deals, rather than better deal quality and incentive alignment. 
We do find evidence that certification effects are associated with better financing terms. For 
instance,  a  strong  target-bank  relationship  predicts  better  financing  terms.  But  the  parent-financing 
“advantage”  remains  unaffected  after  accounting  for  these effects.  We  also  find  that  involvement  in 
private equity generates cross-selling opportunities for banks. While cross-selling does not explain the 
financing patterns by itself, it does offer a rationale for banks’ cyclical involvement in private equity. 
Our  view is  that  these  results  broadly support the concerns  expressed by policy  makers and 
voiced in the theoretical work of Shleifer and Vishny (2010), which predicts pro-cyclical risk taking by 
banks that exacerbates market cycles. We should also point out that, reflecting the complexity of the 
policy  debate  and  the  non-mutually  exclusive  nature  of  various  hypotheses,  we  also  find  direct  and 
indirect evidence for  the positive  views,  even though  on  the  whole the  negative  views  appear  more 
consistent with the collection of our empirical findings. Thus, any potential benefit brought about by the 
Volcker Rule would also be accompanied with losses of other value-enhancing effects. As ours is the first 
set of evidence regarding banks’ activities in the private equity market, there is a need for considerable 
further research. We leave a more definitive assessment of the necessity and effectiveness of the Volcker 
Rule, as well as broader policy implications, to such research.  
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Figure 1 
Private equity activity, 1983-2009 
The figure plots the percentage of all private equity deals that are done by bank-affiliated private equity firms (left 
axis), the  percentage of bank-affiliated deals that are financed by the parent bank (left axis), and all private equity 
deals as a fraction of total equity market capitalization (right axis, units in basis points). A bank-affiliated deal is a 
transaction where the equity sponsor is a bank-affiliated private equity firm. A parent-financed deal is a bank-
affiliated deal where the parent bank also serves as either the lead arranger or co-arranger of the loan backing the 
deal. Private equity transaction information is from Capital IQ. Equity market capitalization corresponds to non-
financial corporate business equity and is compiled from Flow of Funds Accounts. 
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Panel A: Stand-alone private equity deal 
 
 
Panel B: Bank-affiliated private equity deal 
 
 
 
Panel C: Parent-financed private equity deal 
 
 
Figure 2 
Bank involvement in private equity transactions
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Table 1 
League table of private equity activities 
 
   Bank-affiliated sample    Stand-alone sample (Top 15) 
Rank  Sponsor name 
Total 
transactions 
value 
Percent 
of total 
 
Sponsor name 
Total 
transactions 
value 
Percent 
of total 
1  Goldman Sachs Capital Partners  259,595.50  35.44%    KKR & Co    291,840.00   15.78% 
2  Citigroup Private Equity  124,967.70  17.06%    TPG    253,524.80   13.71% 
3  Lehman Brothers Merchant Banking  88,477.70  12.08%    Blackstone Group    222,870.70   12.05% 
4  Merrill Lynch Capital Partners  84,210.65  11.50%    Bain Capital    139,631.50   7.55% 
5  Deutsche Bank Capital Markets  45,711.64  6.24%    Carlyle Group    133,948.80   7.24% 
6  JPMorgan Capital  28,428.82  3.88%    Thomas H Lee Trust    97,397.17   5.27% 
7  Wachovia Partners  23,117.23  3.16%    Apollo Partners    90,544.53   4.90% 
8  CSFB Private Equity  22,968.51  3.14%    Providence Equity Partners    75,746.80   4.10% 
9  CCMP Capital Advisors  15,422.23  2.11%    Madison Dearborn Partners    65,030.27   3.52% 
10  DLJ Merchant Banking  15,154.56  2.07%    Warburg Pincus LLC    52,167.19   2.82% 
11  Macquarie Funds Management  12,082.77  1.65%    Silver Lake    34,511.41   1.87% 
12  Bank of America  5,451.86  0.74%    Welsh Carson Anderson & Stowe    33,665.60   1.82% 
13  Wasserstein & Co  4,651.38  0.63%    Clayton Dubilier & Rice Inc    31,518.00   1.70% 
14  Morgan Stanley Private Equity  2,304.28  0.31%    Hillman & Freeman Co    30,172.36   1.63% 
15  --  --  --     Oak Investment Partners    30,096.46   1.63% 
   Total  732,544.84  100.00%     Total (Whole Sample)  1,849,123.38  100.00% 
 
This table ranks private equity firms by the total dollar amount of transactions they sponsored over the period 1983-2009. A bank-affiliated private equity firm is 
one that has a bank as its parent organization (e.g., Goldman Sachs Capital Partners). A stand-alone private equity firm in contrast does not have a parent 
organization (e.g., KKR & Co). There are a total of 14 bank-affiliated and 79 stand-alone private equity firms in our sample. For compactness, only the top 15 of 
the stand-alone funds are reported. Private equity transaction information is compiled from Capital IQ. Total transaction values are reported in millions of dollars. 
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Table 2 
Transaction and target characteristics 
 
 
All  Stand-alone  Bank affiliated  Parent financed  Diff. (t-stat) 
 
Diff. (t-stat) 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (3) - (2) 
   (4) - (2) 
  
Transaction characteristics: 
                Transaction size  1959.71  1,351.82  2,024.72  7,804.09  1.11 
 
10.37 
*** 
   (4873.61)  (3,151.67)  (7,389.58)  (10,005.56) 
          Cash portion  0.83  0.82  0.84  0.85  0.57 
 
1.43 
 
 
(0.23)  (0.24)  (0.18)  (0.15) 
          EV/Sales  2.31  2.27  2.07  2.66  0.49 
 
0.82 
 
 
(2.50)  (2.52)  (1.51)  (2.74) 
          EV/EBITDA  1.40  1.33  0.54  3.64  -4.03 
***  2.71 
*** 
 
(5.64)  (5.16)  (2.68)  (11.03) 
          Equity/NI  66.06  72.65  30.73  47.06  -2.24 
**  -1.38 
 
 
(190.81)  (213.84)  (35.80)  (53.87) 
        Target characteristics: 
                Total assets  3,124.73  2,661.02  2,481.16  6,744.77  -0.20 
 
4.26 
*** 
 
(7,190.26)  (6,854.73)  (4,755.23)  (9,806.40) 
          Sales  1,538.02  1,248.43  2,074.24  2,971.23  1.49 
 
3.23 
*** 
 
(7,453.46)  (6,158.30)  (12,639.35)  (5,551.68) 
          Debt/Assets  0.39  0.40  0.39  0.30  0.37 
 
-3.05 
*** 
 
(0.31)  (0.31)  (0.31)  (0.25) 
          Debt/EBITDA  3.48  3.44  3.56  3.68  0.18 
 
0.27 
 
 
(6.19)  (6.36)  (4.31)  (6.64) 
          Cash/Assets  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.06  -0.32 
 
-2.33 
** 
 
(0.13)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.09) 
          EBITDA/Assets  0.15  0.15  0.14  0.15  -1.03 
 
-0.23 
 
 
(0.14)  (0.15)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
          EBITDA/Net assets  0.18  0.19  0.15  0.16  -0.92 
 
-0.76 
 
 
(0.65)  (0.74)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
          EBITDA/Sales  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.04  -5.01 
***  1.22 
 
 
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.05)  (0.09) 
          NI/Sales  0.08  0.09  0.10  0.06  -0.37 
 
-1.98 
** 
 
(0.12)  (0.12)  (0.14)  (0.04) 
        Financing statistics: 
                  Loan amount  612.73  489.01  534.58  1924.01  0.58 
 
12.30 
*** 
  (1,603.14)  (1,104.02)  (2,029.48)  (3,233.87)   
   
 
  Loan maturity  6.16  5.78  5.50  11.03  -2.17 
**  6.97 
*** 
  (8.77)  (2.13)  (2.23)  (29.55)   
     
  Loan spread  317.94  316.14  335.76  300.50  2.20 
**  -1.33 
    (147.61)  (146.77)  (152.83)  (142.85)   
     
  Max Debt/EBITDA ratio  5.80  5.66  5.82  6.80  0.51 
 
3.82 
*** 
  (2.11)  (1.99)  (1.87)  (2.83)       
 
 
This table compares targets and transaction characteristics for parent-financed deals versus all other deals.  The data 
were compiled from Capital IQ.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
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Table 3 
Determinants of bank affiliation and parent financing 
 
Panel A: Baseline 
  Bank affiliated  Parent financed    Bank affiliated  Parent financed 
   Coeff.  z-stat 
   Coeff.  z-stat 
  
   Coeff.  z-stat 
   Coeff.  z-stat 
  
Peak year  -0.09  -0.72    0.45  2.29 
**    --  --    --  --   
CLO fund flow  --  --    --  --      1.26  0.34    12.53  2.61 
*** 
Number of investors  -0.13  -0.81    0.28  2.03 
**    -0.16  -0.95    0.23  1.56   
Investment grade  -0.92  -1.50    -1.01  -1.31      -0.52  -0.69    -1.15  -1.04   
Log(Transaction value)  -0.01  -0.08    0.35  3.48 
***  0.00  0.03    0.29  3.01 
*** 
EV/EBITDA  -0.01  -0.28    0.02  0.95      0.01  0.44    0.03  1.53   
Log(Target assets)  -0.05  -1.71 
*  0.02  0.48      -0.07  -2.07 
**  -0.01  -0.17   
EBITDA/Sales  0.01  0.01    -1.90  -1.01      0.79  0.46    -0.90  -0.46   
No financial data  -0.44  -0.67    -0.31  -0.53      -0.10  -0.14    -0.29  -0.43   
Fixed effects:                           
    Industry  Yes      Yes        Yes      Yes     
Observations  2,105      2,105        1,320      1,320     
Pseudo R-squared  0.07    
   0.07    
      0.06    
   0.06    
  
 
Panel B: Including target-bank relationship 
  Bank affiliated  Parent financed    Bank affiliated  Parent financed 
   Coeff.  z-stat 
   Coeff.  z-stat 
  
   Coeff.  z-stat 
   Coeff.  z-stat 
  
Peak year  -0.13  -0.86    0.52  2.25 
**    --  --    --  --   
CLO fund flow  --  --    --  --      2.77  0.66    9.10  1.58   
Target-bank relationship  -0.07  -0.32    0.23  0.64      0.14  0.37    -0.53  -0.96   
Peak year*Target-bank relat.  0.16  0.49    -0.26  -0.58      --  --    --  --   
CLO fund flow*Target-bank relat.  --  --    --  --      -6.45  -0.72    11.92  1.06   
Number of investors  -0.13  -0.83    0.29  2.06 
**    -0.16  -0.92    0.22  1.50   
Investment grade  -0.92  -1.50    -1.01  -1.29      -0.52  -0.68    -1.18  -1.08   
Log(Transaction value)  -0.01  -0.10    0.35  3.50 
***  0.01  0.08    0.29  2.92 
*** 
EV/EBITDA  -0.01  -0.29    0.02  0.96      0.01  0.46    0.03  1.57   
Log(Target assets)  -0.05  -1.69 
*  0.01  0.42      -0.07  -1.97 
**  -0.01  -0.17   
EBITDA/Sales  0.02  0.01    -1.92  -1.02      0.81  0.47    -0.99  -0.51   
No financial data  -0.45  -0.68    -0.30  -0.52      -0.06  -0.08    -0.35  -0.52   
Fixed effects:                           
    Industry  Yes      Yes        Yes      Yes     
Observations  2,105      2,105        1,320      1,320     
Pseudo R-squared  0.07    
   0.07    
      0.07    
   0.07    
  
 
This table examines the determinants of bank-affiliated and parent-financed private equity investments relative to 
stand-alone deals. We estimate multinomial logit regressions, with the stand-alone deals being the omitted category. 
Transaction and target information from Capital IQ is merged with loan data from DealScan  for the 1993-2008 
period. Each observation in the sample corresponds to a different transaction. PEAK YEAR is equal to 1 for 1998-
2000, 2005-2007 years and 0 otherwise. CLO FUND FLOW is the lagged flow of money to CLOs as reported by 
Standard & Poor’s LCD Quarterly Review, scaled by total term loan issuance; high values for this variable indicate 
a positive shock to the credit supply from institutional investors. CLO fund flow data are available from 2001 to 
2008 on a quarterly basis. TARGET-BANK RELATIONSHIP—the focus of the results reported in Panel B—is the 
dollar value of loans in the previous five years arranged by the same lead bank for the target divided by the total 
dollar value of all loans received by the target firm. NUMBER OF INVESTORS is the count of equity investors in 
the  transaction  (club  deals  involve  multiple  investors).  INVESTMENT  GRADE  is  a  dummy  equal  to  1  if  the 
borrower’s rating is BBB or higher and 0 otherwise. NO FINANCIAL DATA is a dummy equal to 1 if target or 
transaction data are incomplete.  
***, 
**, 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4 
Financing terms, 1993-2008 
 
  Loan amount
  Loan maturity
  Loan spread
  Max Debt/EBITDA 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
 
Bank affiliated  -130.84  -1.52    -1.40  -2.50 
**  15.91  1.84 
*  0.21  0.65   
Parent financed  577.24  4.41 
***  3.90  4.58 
***  -33.70  -2.56 
**  0.50  1.28   
Mixed type deal  1,298.52  8.31 
***  6.39  6.29 
***  -5.61  -0.36    0.14  0.31   
Investment grade  217.20  1.04    -1.81  -1.33    -50.22  -2.38 
**  -1.60  -1.86 
* 
Log(Transaction value)  215.52  10.89 
***  -0.02  -0.16    -10.08  -5.07 
***  0.22  3.29 
*** 
EV/EBITDA  6.53  0.89    -0.06  -1.35    -0.21  -0.29    0.02  0.95   
Log(Target assets)  143.40  12.48 
***  0.31  4.21 
***  -9.57  -8.28 
***  0.01  0.2   
EBITDA/Sales  1,772.75  3.74 
***  -0.49  -0.16    13.98  0.29    1.22  1.11   
No financial data  855.27  4.72 
***  1.44  1.22    -37.63  -2.06 
**  0.41  1.01   
                         
Fixed effects:                         
  Industry  Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes     
  Year  Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes     
Observations  2,105      2,105      2,105      536     
R-squared  0.33        0.05        0.20        0.21      
 
This table examines financing terms—loan amount, maturity, spread paid over LIBOR, and maximum debt to EBITDA ratio—on the loans backing the private 
equity transactions. Transaction and target information from Capital IQ is merged with loan data from DealScan for the 1993-2008 period. Each observation in 
the sample corresponds to a different transaction. BANK AFFILIATED is equal to 1 if the deal is backed by a private equity firm affiliated with a bank and 0 
otherwise. PARENT FINANCED is equal to 1 if the parent bank of the private equity sponsor is the lead bank of the lending syndicate and 0 otherwise. We only 
count lenders who participate in the first and second tier of the lending syndicate. Stand-alone private equity deals constitute the omitted category in the analysis. 
MIXED TYPE DEAL is a dummy equal to 1 if the deal is backed by at least one bank-affiliated firm and one stand-alone firm. INVESTMENT GRADE is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the borrower’s rating is BBB or higher and 0 otherwise. Target and transaction data were compiled from Capital IQ. NO FINANCIAL DATA 
is a dummy equal to 1 if target or transaction data are incomplete. 
***, 
**, 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 5  
Certification channels 
  Loan amount  Loan maturity  Loan spread  Max Debt/EBITDA 
   Coeff.  t-stat 
   Coeff.  t-stat 
   Coeff.  t-stat 
   Coeff.  t-stat 
  
  Panel A: Target-bank relationship 
Bank affiliated  -139.91  -1.63    -1.47  -2.65 
***  17.61  2.06 
**  0.18  0.54   
Parent financed  707.7  4.76 
***  6.48  6.75 
***  -43.38  -2.93 
***  0.25  0.56   
Target-bank relationship  193.11  2.47 
**  -0.03  -0.05    -50.81  -6.52 
***  0.3  1.46   
Parent financed*Target-bank relationship  -461.02  -1.84 
*  -9.22  -5.68 
***  33.17  1.32    0.99  1.62   
Other controls  Same as in Table V, not reported for compactness 
     Panel B: Bank reputation in the LBO financing market: 
Bank affiliated  -92.25  -0.98    -1.33  -2.18 
**  17.11  1.81 
*  0.04  0.10   
Parent financed  482.19  3.35 
***  4.83  5.16 
***  -31.62  -2.18 
**  0.90  2.07 
** 
Reputation: LBO market  -184.20  -1.02    -0.23  -0.20    -5.34  -0.29    0.68  1.05   
Parent financed*Reputation  525.68  1.58    -6.02  -2.78 
***  -15.75  -0.47    -2.07  -2.21 
** 
Other controls  Same as in Table V, not reported for compactness 
   
This table examines whether two channels of certification by banks in the lending market—bank information and bank reputation—can explain the superior 
terms enjoyed by parent-financed deals (the effect documented in Table V). Specifications used in Table V are extended to include proxies for these certification 
channels. Bank information is measured by TARGET-BANK RELATIONSHIP, which is the percentage of the target firm’s borrowing in the last five years that 
come from the bank. Bank reputation in the LBO lending market is measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is one of the top five LBO lenders 
identified by Shivdasani and Wang (2011). 
***, 
**, 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Cyclicality in financing terms 
 
Panel A: Peak years  
 
Dependent variable:  Loan amount
  Loan maturity
  Loan spread
  Max Debt/EBITDA 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
 
Bank affiliated  0.16  0.00    -0.29  -0.37    7.81  0.61    0.22  0.51   
Parent financed  16.74  0.08    0.56  0.40    -15.01  -0.64    -0.11  -0.2   
Peak year  191.90  2.56 
**  0.68  1.43    39.89  5.00 
***  0.48  2.05 
** 
Bank affiliated*Peak year  -70.49  -0.42    -1.67  -1.58    14.68  0.82    -0.31  -0.50   
Parent financed*Peak year  763.62  2.76 
***  4.85  2.77 
***  -15.56  -0.53    1.82  2.36 
** 
Target-bank relationship  73.61  0.66    -0.28  -0.4    -6.19  -0.53    0.12  0.45   
Target-bank relationship*Peak year  59.42  0.40    -1.37  -1.46    -44.69  -2.84 
***  0.77  2.03 
** 
Mixed type deal  -23.72  -0.07    0.65  0.30    66.93  1.87 
*  0.33  0.48   
Mixed type deal*Peak year  1,775.72  4.67 
***  7.53  3.12 
***  -56.10  -1.39    0.22  0.25   
Investment grade  231.24  1.09    -1.93  -1.43    -61.13  -2.71 
***  -1.01  -1.15   
Log(Transaction value)  207.00  10.29 
***  -0.002  -0.01    -10.44  -4.88 
***  0.23  3.59 
*** 
EV/EBITDA  1.41  0.19    -0.08  -1.63    -0.57  -0.72    0.02  1.24   
Log(Target assets)  139.35  11.84 
***  0.34  4.54 
***  -7.90  -6.31 
***  0.01  0.47   
EBITDA/Sales  1,746.16  3.63 
***  -0.23  -0.08    -9.15  -0.18    0.86  0.77   
No financial data  767.64  4.17 
***  1.60  1.37    -46.84  -2.39 
**  0.40  0.96   
Fixed effects:                         
  Industry  Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes     
Observations  2,105      2,105      2,105      536     
R-squared  0.30      0.06      0.07      0.18      
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Table 6-continued 
 
Panel B: CLO fund flow 
 
Dependent variable:  Loan amount
  Loan maturity
  Loan spread
  Max Debt/EBITDA 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
 
Bank affiliated  530.22  2.08 
**  -0.09  -0.06    23.10  0.95    2.06  2.79 
*** 
Parent financed  -200.50  -0.5    0.12  0.05    -49.71  -1.30    -1.67  -1.87 
* 
CLO fund flow  9,815.32  3.55 
***  26.16  1.48    -181.32  -0.68    28.87  3.63 
*** 
Bank affiliated*CLO fund flow  -17,032.44  -2.78 
***  -41.99  -1.07    -126.88  -0.22    -57.29  -2.52 
** 
Parent financed*CLO fund flow  22,164.21  2.5 
**  107.66  1.90 
*  138.50  0.16    45.15  1.68 
* 
Target-bank relationship  362.38  1.74 
*  0.52  0.39    -47.33  -2.37 
**  -0.08  -0.20   
Target-bank relat.*CLO fund flow  -6,618.37  -1.3    -69.22  -2.13 
**  -426.32  -0.88    16.12  1.34   
Mixed type deal  1,194.02  2.63 
***  -0.24  -0.08    -10.71  -0.25    -0.26  -0.30   
Mixed type deal*CLO fund flow  2,054.09  0.21    163.59  2.59 
***  403.77  0.43    22.73  0.94   
Investment grade  844.30  2.29 
**  -2.31  -0.98    -97.98  -2.78 
***  -2.77  -2.45 
** 
Log(Transaction value)  241.85  8.48 
***  0.02  0.11    -11.99  -4.38 
***  0.26  3.29 
*** 
EV/EBITDA  16.50  1.25    -0.07  -0.85    0.72  0.56    0.09  2.09 
** 
Log(Target assets)  184.01  10.33 
***  0.48  4.20 
***  -9.71  -5.68 
***  0.06  1.86 
* 
EBITDA/Sales  2,608.97  3.43 
***  -1.45  -0.30    0.74  0.01    1.00  0.49   
No financial data  1,353.11  4.61 
***  3.41  1.81 
*  -41.59  -1.48    1.19  1.72 
* 
Fixed effects:                         
  Industry  Yes      Yes      Yes      Yes     
Observations  1,320      1,320      1,320      320     
R-squared  0.31      0.07      0.10      0.25     
 
This table re-examines financing terms—loan amount, maturity, spread paid over LIBOR, and maximum debt to EBITDA ratio—on the loans backing the 
private equity transactions, focusing on cyclicality. The sample and variables definitions are identical to Table V. In Panel A, the focus is on the interaction terms 
with the PEAK YEAR dummy. PEAK YEAR is equal to 1 for 1998-2000, 2005-2007 years and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, the focus is on the interaction terms with 
the CLO FUND FLOW. CLO FUND FLOW is the lagged flow of money to CLOs as reported by Standard & Poor’s LCD Quarterly Review. We use CLO fund 
flow scaled by total term loan issuance; high values for this variable indicate bullish institutional sentiment. CLO fund flow data are available from 2001 to 2008 
on a quarterly basis. 
***, 
**, 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 7 
Loan outcomes and equity exits: Univariate analysis 
 
   Stand-alone  Bank 
affiliated 
Parent 
financed  Diff. (t-stat) 
   Diff. (t-stat) 
  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (2) - (1) 
   (3) - (1) 
  
All years:                
  Debt: Upgrade  0.34  0.23  0.35  -3.27 
***  0.09   
  Debt: Downgrade  0.48  0.61  0.50  3.41 
***  0.44   
  Exit: IPO  0.13  0.12  0.46  -0.37    2.31 
** 
  Exit: Trade sale  0.72  0.74  0.38  1.25    -2.39 
** 
  Exit: Bankruptcy  0.05  0.07  0.15  1.74 
*  0.94   
  Holding Period  47.10  45.20  18.08  -1.15 
 
-6.26 
*** 
                Peak years:               
  Debt: Upgrade  0.33  0.18  0.34  -3.19 
***  0.17   
  Debt: Downgrade  0.49  0.66  0.50  3.46 
***  0.35   
  Exit: IPO  0.09  0.12  0.25  1.66 
*  0.94   
  Exit: Trade sale  0.78  0.74  0.50  1.36    -1.46   
  Exit: Bankruptcy  0.06  0.08  0.25  1.38    1.15   
  Holding Period  47.90  46.50  20.00  -0.59 
 
-3.98 
*** 
                Non-peak years:               
  Debt: Upgrade  0.35  0.29  0.36  -1.31    0.12   
  Debt: Downgrade  0.48  0.55  0.49  1.23    0.23   
  Exit: IPO  0.15  0.12  0.80  -1.50    3.23 
*** 
  Exit: Trade sale  0.68  0.75  0.20  2.37    -2.40 
** 
  Exit: Bankruptcy  0.05  0.06  0.00  0.67    -3.08 
*** 
  Holding Period  46.40  43.10  14.10  1.48 
   -26.73 
*** 
 
This table examines  the performance of the loans backing the private equity deals and the exits of the equity 
investments in our sample. For the performance of the loans, we focus on upgrades and downgrades of the credit 
ratings subsequent to consummation of the private equity transaction. For equity exits, we examine IPO, trade sale, 
and bankruptcies. 
***, 
**, 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Loan outcomes and equity exits: Regressions 
 
Panel A: Loan 
 
  Loan upgrade    Loan downgrade 
   dF/dx  z-stat     dF/dx  z-stat       dF/dx  z-stat     dF/dx  z-stat    
Bank affiliated  -0.11  -2.77 
***  -0.07  -1.25   
  0.16  3.74 
***  0.06  1.01   
Parent financed  -0.01  -0.19    0.03  0.50   
  0.04  1.10    -0.01  -0.23   
Peak year  --      -0.01  -0.28      --      0.00  -0.15   
Bank affiliated*Peak year  --      -0.15  -2.13 
**    --      0.25  3.20 
*** 
Parent financed*Peak year  --      -0.09  -1.28      --      0.13  1.64 
* 
Control variables  Yes 
   
Yes 
   
  Yes      Yes     
Fixed effects: Industry/Year  Yes/Yes 
   
Yes/No 
   
  Yes/Yes      Yes/No     
Observations  1,919      1,919        1,919      1,919     
 
 
Panel B: Equity 
 
  Exit: IPO    Exit: Trade sale    Exit: Bankruptcy 
   dF/dx  z-stat     dF/dx  z-stat       dF/dx  z-stat    dF/dx  z-stat      dF/dx  z-stat     dF/dx  z-stat    
Bank affiliated  0.04  2.45 
**  -0.03  -1.38   
  -0.05  -2.10 
**  0.04  1.09      0.02  1.79 
*  0.03  2.56 
** 
Parent financed  0.15  1.62    0.57  2.54 
**    -0.08  -0.65    -0.34  -1.42      0.04  0.56    -0.03  -0.01   
Peak year  --      -0.05  -3.39 
***    --      0.06  3.14 
***    --      0.01  2.25 
** 
Bank affiliated*Peak year  --      0.11  2.62 
***    --      -0.11  -2.24 
**    --      -0.02  -1.33   
Parent financed*Peak year  --      -0.12  -2.04 
**    --      0.22  1.43      --      0.97  0.01   
Control variables  Yes 
   
Yes 
   
  Yes      Yes        Yes      Yes     
Fixed effects: Industry/Year  Yes/Yes 
   
Yes/No 
   
  Yes/No      Yes/No        Yes/Yes      Yes/No     
Observations  1,952      1,952        1,952      1,952        1,952      1,952     
 
This table reports results of probit regressions of loan outcomes. We focus on loan upgrades and downgrades of the credit ratings subsequent to consummation of 
the private equity transaction. In Panel A, the dependent variables, Loan upgrade (Loan downgrade), is a dummy equal 1 if the credit rating of the loan backing 
the private equity transaction is upgraded (downgraded) following the deal closure, and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, the dependent variable is dummy equal 1 if an 
investment experienced the corresponding type of exit and 0 otherwise. Each regression includes a set of standard control variables used throughout the paper 
(not reported). 
***, 
**, 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
44 
 
Table 9 
Cyclicality of bank loan share 
 
Dependent variable:  Parent bank loan share
    Overall bank allocation 
 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
    Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
 
Peak year  -2.58  -3.79 
***  --  --      -0.06  -2.60 
**  --  --   
CLO fund flow  --  --    -9.74  -2.12 
**    --  --    -0.23  -1.49   
Investment grade  3.81  1.31    -0.08  -0.03      0.15  1.60    -0.17  -1.91 
* 
Log(Transaction value)  0.1  0.26    0.00  0.02      0.01  0.45    0.01  1.4   
EV/EBITDA  -0.19  -5.02 
***  -0.19  -8.21 
***    0.01  4.45 
***  0.00  6.33 
*** 
Log(Target assets)  -0.19  -1.94 
*  -0.08  -1.21      0.00  1.15    0.01  3.84 
*** 
EBITDA/Sales  9.47  1.43    4.27  0.99      0.59  2.66 
***  0.28  1.9 
* 
No financial data  -0.74  -0.34    -0.16  -0.12      0.19  2.65 
***  0.22  4.99 
*** 
                           
Fixed effects:                           
  Industry  Yes      Yes        Yes      Yes     
Observations  171      137        171      137     
R-squared  0.36      0.55        0.20      0.44     
 
This table analyzes the cyclicality of bank share of loan financing backing bank-affiliated private equity transactions. The sample includes parent-financed 
transactions. (The number of observations is also reduced due to the unavailability of the dependent variable.) PARENT BANK LOAN SHARE is the fraction of 
the loan financed by the parent bank. We use predicted share when the actual data are not available.  Predicted share is computed based on the lender’s syndicate 
role, number of syndicate members, loan size, type, maturity and year using all DealScan U.S. data where bank syndicate share is not missing. OVERALL BANK 
ALLOCATION is share of the loan funded by banks, as opposed to non-bank institutions. PEAK YEAR is a dummy equal to 1 for 1998-2000, and 2005-2007 and 
0 otherwise. CLO FUND FLOW is flow of money to CLOs as reported by Standard & Poor’s LCD Quarterly Review, scaled by total term loan issuance. We lag 
this variable by one quarter. Each observation in the sample corresponds to a different transaction; other variable definitions are the same as in Table V.  
***, 
**, 
* 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 10 
Cross-selling of other banking services to the target 
 
  Full sample 
  Excluding commercial banks 
  Excluding Goldman Sachs 
 
  Coeff.  dF/dx  z-stat 
  Coeff.  dF/dx  z-stat 
  Coeff.  dF/dx  z-stat 
 
  Panel A: Future lender choice
 
Bank is PE sponsor’s parent   0.0751  0.0131  0.83 
   0.4602  0.1038  3.13 
***  -0.0293  -0.0048  -0.28 
  
Bank was the original lender  1.8441  0.5995  29.71 
***  1.7206  0.5629  20.83 
***  1.7741  0.5772  24.2 
*** 
Fixed effects:                         
  Bank/ Industry/ Year  Yes/ Yes/ Yes    Yes/ Yes/ Yes    Yes/ Yes/ Yes   
Observations  34,162    30,093    32,840   
Pseudo R
2 (%)   0.10 
 
 
   0.09 
 
 
   0.09 
 
 
  
  Panel B: Future M&A advisor choice
 
Bank is PE sponsor’s parent   0.4276  0.0512  3.01 
***  0.5417  0.0845  3.31 
***  0.2807  0.0311  1.21    
Bank was the original lender  0.9520  0.1650  12.82 
***  1.2246  0.2818  13.82 
***  0.8758  0.1497  9.29 
*** 
Fixed effects:                         
  Bank/ Industry/ Year  Yes/ Yes/ Yes    Yes/ Yes/ Yes    Yes/ Yes/ Yes   
Observations  23,775    15,447    17,832   
Pseudo R
2 (%)  0.02 
 
 
   0.03 
 
 
   0.01 
 
 
  
  Panel C: Future underwriter choice
 
Bank is PE sponsor’s parent   0.9111  0.1568  7.54 
***  0.9176  0.1587  6.74 
***  0.6840  0.1044  4.02 
*** 
Bank was the original lender  0.6573  0.0943  6.23 
***  0.6961  0.1028  6.10 
***  0.4632  0.0597  3.25 
*** 
Fixed effects:                         
  Bank/ Industry/ Year  Yes/ Yes/ Yes    Yes/ Yes/ Yes    Yes/ Yes/ Yes   
Observations  20,600    17,775    14,784   
Pseudo R
2 (%)  0.01 
 
 
   0.01 
 
 
   0.01 
 
 
  
 
This table examines banks’ ability to cross-sell other banking services—additional lending, M&A advisory, and equity underwriting—to the target firms of the 
private equity transactions (following the original buyout). The empirical model is a conditional logit. The column dF/dx reports conditional probabilities. Each 
observation is a pairing of the target firm in the private equity transaction with a set of potential banks. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 for the 
banks chosen for the transaction and 0 otherwise.  BANK IS PE SPONSOR’S PARENT (short SPONSOR’S PARENT) is a dummy equal to 1 if the bank was the 
parent of the private equity sponsor of the original PE transaction and 0 otherwise. BANK WAS THE ORIGINAL LENDER (short ORIGINAL LENDER) is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the bank led the loan syndicate of the original private equity transaction and 0 otherwise. In the conditional logit model, deal characteristics 
are not required; however, we include lender fixed effects to account for the fact that some lenders do more deals than others. The analysis also includes industry 
and year fixed effects. 
***, 
**, 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 
Bank-affiliated private equity spin-offs 
 
Dependent variable:  Loan amount 
  Loan maturity 
  Loan spread 
 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
 
Parent financed  204.46  0.95    2.14  1.83 
*  -17.85  -1.09   
After spin-off  -349.04  -0.99    -0.85  -0.45    44.17  1.64   
Parent financed*After spin-off  -155.19  -0.25    -0.7  -0.21    -19.28  -0.41   
Mixed type deal  988.35  3.09 
***  4.31  2.49 
**  11.58  0.48   
Investment grade  781.48  0.93    -1.58  -0.35    -99.77  -1.55   
Log(Transaction value)  525.31  5.47 
***  -0.4  -0.77    -15.68  -2.14 
** 
EV/EBITDA  -7.08  -0.26    -0.03  -0.21    0.35  0.17   
Log(Target assets)  182.33  5.18 
***  0.41  2.17 
**  -12.3  -4.59 
*** 
EBITDA/Sales  12,836.51  5.51 
***  -1.19  -0.09    190.76  1.07   
No financial data  2,918.11  3.46 
***  3.21  0.7    -69.27  -1.08   
                 
 
Fixed effects:                   
  Industry  Yes      Yes      Yes     
  Year  Yes      Yes      Yes     
Observations  445      445      445     
R-squared  0.49      0.06      0.25     
 
This  table  examines  financing  terms—loan  amount,  loan  maturity,  and  loan-spread—for  the  private  equity 
transactions done by firms that were spun-off from a bank holding company. We have insufficient data to analyze 
debt covenant (Maximum Debt to EBITDA ratio) in this sample. The dummy variable AFTER SPIN-OFF is equal to 
1  in  the  years  following  private  equity  firm  separation  from  the  bank  holding  company.  The  interaction  term, 
PARENT FINANCED*AFTER SPIN-OFF, captures the incremental effect of the spin-off on having the parent bank 
on the lending syndicate. Other variable definitions are identical to Table V. 
***, 
**, 
* indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 